Rational Belief and Probability Kinematics

Abstract

A general form is proposed for epistemological theories, the relevant factors being: the family of epistemic judgments, the epistemic state, the epistemic commitment (governing change of state), and the family of possible epistemic inputs (deliverances of experience). First a simple theory is examined in which the states are probability functions, and the subject of probability kinematics introduced by Richard Jeffrey is explored. Then a second theory is examined in which the state has as constituents a body of information (rational corpus) and a recipe that determines the accepted epistemic judgments on the basis of this corpus. Through an examination of several approaches to the statistical syllogism, a relation is again established with Jeffrey's generalized conditionalization.

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