Are Social Preferences Skin Deep? Dictators under Cognitive Load

Abstract

We study the impact of cognitive load in dictator games to test two conflicting views of\nmoral behavior. Are social preferences skin‐deep in the sense that they are the result of\nhumans’ cognitive reasoning while the natural instinct is selfish, or is rather the natural\ninstinct to share fairly while our cognitive capacities are able to adjust moral principles in a\nself‐serving manner? Some previous studies in more complex settings give conflicting\nanswers, and to disentangle different possible mechanisms we use simple games. We study\nboth charitable giving and the behavior of dictators under high and low cognitive load,\nwhere high cognitive load is assumed to reduce the impact of cognitive processes on\nbehavior. In the dictator game we use both a give frame, where the dictator is given an\namount and may share some or all of it to a partner, and a take frame, where dictators may\ntake from an amount initially allocated to the partner. The results from four different studies\nindicate that the effect of cognitive load is small if at all existing.

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