SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
Executive Compensation in EREITs: EREIT Size is but One Determinant
10 references·2 citing·43 second hop
Executive Compensation in EREITs: EREIT Size is but One Determinant (1998)Executive Compensation in EREITs: EREIT S…CEO Incentives: It's Not How Much You Pay, But How (1999)CEO Incentives: It's Not How …Executive Compensation and Financial Performance in the Real Estate Industry (1995)Executive Compensation and Fi…An Empirical Examination of Compensation of REIT Managers (1995)An Empirical Examination of C…Interindustry Differences in the Relation between Compensation and Firm Performance Variables (1991)Interindustry Differences in …How sensitive is executive compensation to organizational size? (1991)How sensitive is executive co…Matrix management: not a structure, a frame of mind. (1990)Matrix management: not a stru…Executive Pay and Firm Performance (1990)Executive Pay and Firm Perfor…Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance (1985)Executive compensation, manag…The Determinants of Executive Salaries: An Econometric Survey (1980)The Determinants of Executive…Managerial Pay and Corporate Performance (1970)Managerial Pay and Corporate …Introducing “Focused Firms”: Implications from REIT Prime Operating Revenue (2021)Introducing “Focused Firms”: …What Influences the Changes in REIT CEO Compensation? Evidence from Panel Data (2011)What Influences the Changes i…The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1933)The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment (1958)A Life Cycle Theory of the Firm (1972)Corporate Ownership and Control: The Large Corporation and the Capitalist Class (1974)THE VALUATION OF RISK ASSETS AND THE SELECTION OF RISKY INVESTMENTS IN STOCK PORTFOLIOS AND CAPITAL BUDGETS**This paper is another in a series of interrelated theoretical and statistical studies of corporate financial and investment policies being made under grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, and more recently the Ford Foundation, to the Harvard Business School. The generous support for this work is most gratefully acknowledged. The author is also much indebted to his colleagues Professors Bishop, Christenson, Kahr, Raiffa, and (especially) Schlaifer, for extensive discussion and commentary on an earlier draft of this paper; but responsibility for any errors or imperfections remains strictly his own.[Professor Sharpe's paper, “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk” (Journal of Finance, September 1964) appeared after this paper was in final form and on its way to the printers. My first section, which parallels the first half of his paper (with corresponding conclusions), sets the algebraic framework for sections II, III and VI, (which have no counterpart in his paper) and for section IV on the equilibrium prices of risk assets, concerning which our results differ significantly for reasons which will be explored elsewhere. Sharpe does not take up the capital budgeting problem developed in section V below.] (1975)Matching compensation and organizational strategies (1990)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives (1990)Rewards and Performance of Swedish Real Estate Firms (2009)The market for corporate control (1983)Executive incentives and the horizon problem (1991)INSTRUMENTAL STAKEHOLDER THEORY: A SYNTHESIS OF ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1995)The Provision of Incentives in Firms (1999)The Effect of Interest Rate Changes on the Common Stock Returns of Financial Institutions (1984)An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation of Corporate Executives (1986)Money and Motivation (1977)BOARDS OF DIRECTORS, TOP MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION, AND SHAREHOLDER RETURNS. (1987)Executive Compensation: Six Questions that Need Answering (1999)Firm Strategy and Age Dependence: A Contingent View of the Liabilities of Newness, Adolescence, and Obsolescence (1999)Executive compensation (2008)Outside directors and CEO turnover (1988)Stock prices and top management changes (1988)The Costs and Benefits of Managerial Incentives and Monitoring in Large U.S. Corporations: When is More not Better? (1994)The Growth of Executive Pay (2005)Pay without Performance (2006)Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts (1981)The effect of bonus schemes on accounting decisions (1985)Employee Compensation: Research and Practice (1992)What Makes Them Tick? Employee Motives and Firm Innovation (2008)The functions and dysfunctions of hierarchy (2010)Corporate performance and managerial remuneration (1985)Compensation and Incentives: Practice vs. Theory (1988)The Employer Size-Wage Effect (1989)AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF THE RESOURCE-BASED THEORY: STRATEGIC REGULATION IN THE DUTCH AUDIT INDUSTRY (1996)Organizational performance referents: An empirical examination of their content and influences (2003)CONTINGENCIES IN THE EFFECTS OF PAY RANGE ON ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS (2009)Mapping Management Accounting: Graphics and Guidelines for Theory-Consistent Empirical Research (2002)Additional Evidence on the Sticky Behavior of Costs (2003)Additional Evidence on the Sticky Behavior of Costs (2016)Information-Processing Theory and the Multinational Enterprise (1991)Cross-Functional Structures: A Review and Integration of Matrix Organization and Project Management (1992)Cultural Diversity and the Performance of Multinational Firms (1997)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1985Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance1,209 cited
  • 1999CEO Incentives: It's Not How Much You Pay, But How544 cited
  • 1990Matrix management: not a structure, a frame of mind.358 cited
  • 1990Executive Pay and Firm Performance352 cited
  • 1970Managerial Pay and Corporate Performance314 cited
  • 1980The Determinants of Executive Salaries: An Econometric Survey244 cited
  • 1991Interindustry Differences in the Relation between Compensation and Firm Performance Variables139 cited
  • 1991How sensitive is executive compensation to organizational size?125 cited
  • 1995An Empirical Examination of Compensation of REIT Managers23 cited
  • 1995Executive Compensation and Financial Performance in the Real Estate Industry20 cited

Cited by

  • 2011What Influences the Changes in REIT CEO Compensation? Evidence from Panel Data16 cited
  • 2021Introducing “Focused Firms”: Implications from REIT Prime Operating Revenue16 cited

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work