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IMAGINABILITY, CONCEIVABILITY, POSSIBILITY AND THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM
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IMAGINABILITY, CONCEIVABILITY, POSSIBILITY AND THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM (1997)IMAGINABILITY, CONCEIVABILITY, POSSIBILIT…Aboutness in imagination (2017)Aboutness in imaginationThe Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding (2015)The Role of Consciousness in …The Heterogeneity of the Imagination (2011)The Heterogeneity of the Imag…The Waning of Materialism (2010)The Waning of MaterialismPhenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap (2010)Phenomenal Concepts and the E…A PosterioriPhysicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong (2010)A PosterioriPhysicalists Get …Why Panpsychism Doesn't Help us Explain Consciousness (2009)Why Panpsychism Doesn't Help …There Are No Phenomenal Concepts (2009)There Are No Phenomenal Conce…The Two‐Dimensional Argument Against Materialism (2009)The Two‐Dimensional Argument …POSSIBILITY AND IMAGINATION* (2007)POSSIBILITY AND IMAGINATION*Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap (2007)Phenomenal Concepts and the E…Max Black's Objection to Mind‐Body Identity (2007)Max Black's Objection to Mind…Ignorance and Imagination (2006)Ignorance and ImaginationZombies and Consciousness (2005)Zombies and ConsciousnessPhysicalism and Phenomenal Concepts (2005)Physicalism and Phenomenal Co…Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality (1999)Materialism and the Metaphysi…Philosophical Investigations. (1954)Naming and Necessity (1972)What Is It Like to Be a Bat? (1974)Phenomenal Concepts (2009)In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy 1 (2011)Acquaintance and the mind–body problem (2012)Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. (1993)Metaphysical Emergence: Weak and Strong (2015)A Treatise of Human Nature (1739)Imaginative Attitudes (2014)Explaining Imagination (2020)Mental Imagery (2023)Individualism and the Mental (1979)The meaning of ‘meaning’ (2010)Human and Animal Minds (2019)Knowing by Perceiving (2019)Consciousness, Concepts and Natural Kinds (2020)The Principles of Psychology (1891)MATERIALISM AND QUALIA: THE EXPLANATORY GAP (1983)The Concept of Mind (2006)The Problem with Phi: A Critique of Integrated Information Theory (2015)Panpsychism (2016)The Conscious Mind (1996)On the Plurality of Worlds (1986)The conscious mind: in search of a fundamental theory (1996)Mind, Language and Reality (1975)Knowledge and Its Limits (2000)The Structure and Dynamics Argument against Materialism (2015)Combining Minds (2019)The Problem of the Essential Indexical (1979)The Case Against Cognitive Phenomenology (2011)THE EVOLUTIONARY ARGUMENT FOR PHENOMENAL POWERS (2017)The Meanings of “Imagine” Part I: Constructive Imagination (2013)Imaginative Vividness (2017)
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Cited by

  • 2011The Heterogeneity of the Imagination220 cited
  • 2005Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts218 cited
  • 2006Ignorance and Imagination191 cited
  • 2005Zombies and Consciousness177 cited
  • 1999Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality175 cited
  • 2009Why Panpsychism Doesn't Help us Explain Consciousness163 cited
  • 2009The Two‐Dimensional Argument Against Materialism163 cited
  • 2009There Are No Phenomenal Concepts145 cited
  • 2007POSSIBILITY AND IMAGINATION*143 cited
  • 2007Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap117 cited
  • 2010The Waning of Materialism113 cited
  • 2007Max Black's Objection to Mind‐Body Identity104 cited
  • 2010A PosterioriPhysicalists Get Our Phenomenal Concepts Wrong97 cited
  • 2010Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap92 cited
  • 2015The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding91 cited
  • 2017Aboutness in imagination88 cited

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