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CEO Pensions: Disclosure, Managerial Power, and Optimal Contracting · Study

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PreprintCEO Pensions: Disclosure, Managerial Power, and Optimal Contracting

Joseph J. Gerakos2007

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Preprintgreen2007

CEO Pensions: Disclosure, Managerial Power, and Optimal Contracting

Joseph J. Gerakos

67 citations·0/0 files stored·SSRN Electronic Journal

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Corporate Finance and Governance Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance Financial Literacy, Pension, Retirement Analysis

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References

2001Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data 1996Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors 2003Corporate Governance and Equity Prices 1999Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance 1992The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies 1983Discretionary disclosure 2008Executive compensation 1979Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?

Cited by

2017Direct and indirect risk-taking incentives of inside debt 2017Executive compensation and corporate financing policies: Evidence from CEO inside debt 2010Executive Inside Debt Holdings and Creditors’ Demand for Pricing and Non-Pricing Protections 2013Executive compensation, risk taking and the state of the economy 2012CEO inside debt and hedging decisions: Lessons from the U.S. banking industry 2010Managerial Ownership of Debt and Bank Loan Contracting

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2017Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidence ✶ ✶We thank Aubrey Clark, Fabrizio Ferri, Carola Frydman, Tom Gosling, Steve Kaplan, Gaizka Ormazabal, Kelly Shue, Alexander Wagner, David Zhang, and especially Pierre Chaigneau for helpful comments and Janet Chater, Irem Erten, Jesus Gorrin, Joseph Kalmenovitz, and Jiaying Wei for research assistance.chapter · 14 shared references 2008Chief Executive Officers and the Pay-Pension Tradeoffarticle · 12 shared references 2017Executive Compensation: A Survey of Theory and Evidencepreprint · 10 shared references 2010Economic and psychological perspectives on CEO compensation: a review and synthesisarticle · 10 shared references 2011Are Incentive Contracts Rigged by Powerful CEOs?article · 9 shared references 2013Institutional Investor Preferences for Corporate Governance Mechanismsarticle · 9 shared references

Details

Year2007

Typepreprint

Published2007-01-01

VenueSSRN Electronic Journal

ISSN-L1556-5068

Languageen

Citations67

Files0 public / 0

ShelfCorporate Finance and Governance

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doi10.2139/ssrn.982180

openalex_workW1492074604

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2021CEO inside debt and internal capital market efficiency

2011Investor Reactions to CEOs’ Inside Debt Incentives