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Junta Distributions and the Average-Case Complexity of Manipulating Elections

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References

1975Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions2,821 cited
1989Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election548 cited
1989The computational difficulty of manipulating an election530 cited
1991Single transferable vote resists strategic voting394 cited
1992How hard is it to control an election?391 cited

Cited by

2006Dichotomy for voting systems128 cited
2008Algorithms for the coalitional manipulation problem126 cited
2009Eliciting Single-Peaked Preferences Using Comparison Queries123 cited
2011Multimode Control Attacks on Elections117 cited
2008Complexity of Strategic Behavior in Multi-Winner Elections115 cited
2009Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under some common voting rules108 cited
2008Copeland voting: ties matter108 cited
2013Better Human Computation Through Principled Voting107 cited
2008Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability106 cited
2011Unweighted Coalitional Manipulation Under the Borda Rule Is NP-Hard95 cited

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2010Bypassing Combinatorial Protections: Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Single-Peaked Electorates84 cited

2009Where are the really hard manipulation problems? The phase transition in manipulating the veto rule83 cited

2013The complexity of manipulative attacks in nearly single-peaked electorates82 cited

2016Barriers to Manipulation in Voting81 cited

2009Sincere‐Strategy Preference‐Based Approval Voting Fully Resists Constructive Control and Broadly Resists Destructive Control79 cited

2015Bypassing Combinatorial Protections: Polynomial-Time Algorithms for Single-Peaked Electorates71 cited