Dispute Resolution Institutions and Strategic Militarization

Adam Meirowitz · Massimo Morelli · Kristopher W. Ramsay · Francesco Squintani C D

41 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Political Economy

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Game Theory and Applications International Relations and Foreign Policy Political Conflict and Governance

Abstract

Engagement in a destructive war can be understood as the “punishment” for entering into a dispute. Institutions that reduce the chance that disputes lead to war make this punishment less severe. This may incentivize hawkish policies like militarization and potentially offset the benefits of peace brokering. We study a model in which unmediated peace talks are effective at improving the peace chance for given militarization but lead to more militarization and ultimately to a higher incidence of war. Instead, a form of third-party mediation inspired by work of Myerson effectively brokers peace in emerged disputes and also minimizes equilibrium militarization.

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References

1995Rationalist explanations for war 1958Compliance, identification, and internalization three processes of attitude change 1953Two-Person Cooperative Games 1984The Art and Science of Negotiation.1979Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem 2015Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma 1997Signaling Foreign Policy Interests 2006War as a Commitment Problem

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