Revelation and the Nature of Colour

Abstract

Forthcoming in dialectica. Please refer to the final version. According to naïve realist (or primitivist) theories of colour, colours are sui generis mind-independent properties. The question that I consider in this paper is the relationship of naïve realism to what Mark Johnston calls Revelation, the thesis that the essential nature of colour is fully revealed in a standard visual experience. In the first part of the paper, I argue that if naïve realism is true, then Revelation is false. In the second part of the paper, I defend naïve realism against a number of objections. 1. NAÏVE REALISM AND REVELATION The naïve realist theory of colour can be understood as the conjunction of two theses: MIND-INDEPENDENCE: colours are properties of material objects, light sources, etc. whose essential nature is constitutively independent of the experiences of perceiving subjects; DISTINCTNESS: colours are sui generis properties that are distinct from properties described in the vocabulary of physical science. The claim that colours are mind-independent properties of material objects (etc.) distinguishes naïve realism from broadly speaking subjectivist theories of colour: from dispositional theories

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