Theory of mind and autism: a fifteen year review

Abstract

Abstract There is a danger when something gets discussed too much, its importance gets overlooked. ‘Theory of mind’ as a topic in developmental psychology may be facing that danger. Fifteen years ago, the topic was relatively under-researched, and its arrival into science opened a floodgate of research, much of which has been summarized in a number of influential books (Astington 1994; Astington et al. 1988; Baron-Cohen 1995; Baron-Cohen et al. 19936; Mitchell and Lewis 1995; Moore and Dunham 1996; Perner 1991; Wellman 1990; Whiten 1991). Fifteen years later, the field is that much more mature, and many of the relevant findings from normal development are summarized in the chapter by Wellman, this volume (Chapter 2). But readers should be on their guard not to consider the topic any less important today: a theory of mind remains one of the quintessential abilities that makes us human (Whiten 1993). By theory of mind we mean being able to infer the full range of mental states (beliefs, desires, intentions, imagination, emotions, etc.) that cause action. In brief, to be able to reflect on the contents of one’s own and other’s minds.

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