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An Empirical Examination of Compensation of REIT Managers
16 references·3 citing·46 second hop
An Empirical Examination of Compensation of REIT Managers (1995)An Empirical Examination of Compensation …Return Properties of Equity REITs, Common Stocks, and Commercial Real Estate: A Comparison (1993)Return Properties of Equity R…Initial public offerings of equity securities (1992)Initial public offerings of e…Interindustry Differences in the Relation between Compensation and Firm Performance Variables (1991)Interindustry Differences in …Risk and Return on Real Estate: Evidence from Equity REITs (1990)Risk and Return on Real Estat…REIT Advisor Performance (1990)REIT Advisor PerformancePerformance Pay and Top-Management Incentives (1990)Performance Pay and Top-Manag…Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers (1989)Relative Performance Evaluati…The self-serving management hypothesis (1985)The self-serving management h…Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance (1985)Executive compensation, manag…Corporate performance and managerial remuneration (1985)Corporate performance and man…The Determinants of Executive Salaries: An Econometric Survey (1980)The Determinants of Executive…Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information (1979)Optimal incentive contracts w…Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Moral Hazard and ObservabilityFinancial leverage clienteles (1979)Financial leverage clientelesTheory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Theory of the firm: Manageria…Managerial Pay and Corporate Performance (1970)Managerial Pay and Corporate …What Influences the Changes in REIT CEO Compensation? Evidence from Panel Data (2011)What Influences the Changes i…Rewards and Performance of Swedish Real Estate Firms (2009)Rewards and Performance of Sw…Executive Compensation in EREITs: EREIT Size is but One Determinant (1998)Executive Compensation in ERE…The Theory of Syndicates (1968)Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. (1972)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)Agency Costs, Net Worth, And Business Fluctuations (1988)The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1933)The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment (1958)A Life Cycle Theory of the Firm (1972)Corporate Ownership and Control: The Large Corporation and the Capitalist Class (1974)THE VALUATION OF RISK ASSETS AND THE SELECTION OF RISKY INVESTMENTS IN STOCK PORTFOLIOS AND CAPITAL BUDGETS**This paper is another in a series of interrelated theoretical and statistical studies of corporate financial and investment policies being made under grants from the Rockefeller Foundation, and more recently the Ford Foundation, to the Harvard Business School. The generous support for this work is most gratefully acknowledged. The author is also much indebted to his colleagues Professors Bishop, Christenson, Kahr, Raiffa, and (especially) Schlaifer, for extensive discussion and commentary on an earlier draft of this paper; but responsibility for any errors or imperfections remains strictly his own.[Professor Sharpe's paper, “Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk” (Journal of Finance, September 1964) appeared after this paper was in final form and on its way to the printers. My first section, which parallels the first half of his paper (with corresponding conclusions), sets the algebraic framework for sections II, III and VI, (which have no counterpart in his paper) and for section IV on the equilibrium prices of risk assets, concerning which our results differ significantly for reasons which will be explored elsewhere. Sharpe does not take up the capital budgeting problem developed in section V below.] (1975)Matching compensation and organizational strategies (1990)The market for corporate control (1983)Executive incentives and the horizon problem (1991)INSTRUMENTAL STAKEHOLDER THEORY: A SYNTHESIS OF ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1995)The Provision of Incentives in Firms (1999)The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities (1973)The theory and practice of econometrics (1986)Management ownership and market valuation (1988)Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers (1996)A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)Money and Motivation (1977)BOARDS OF DIRECTORS, TOP MANAGEMENT COMPENSATION, AND SHAREHOLDER RETURNS. (1987)Executive Compensation: Six Questions that Need Answering (1999)Firm Strategy and Age Dependence: A Contingent View of the Liabilities of Newness, Adolescence, and Obsolescence (1999)Executive compensation (2008)On Moral Hazard and Insurance (1979)Redistributive taxation as social insurance (1980)A Theory of Wage Dynamics (1982)Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1996)Outside directors and CEO turnover (1988)High Wage Workers and High Wage Firms (1999)The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems (1999)The Nature of the Firm (1937)CAPITAL ASSET PRICES: A THEORY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK* (1964)Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have (1984)Law and Finance (1998)The arbitrage theory of capital asset pricing (1976)Economic Forces and the Stock Market (1986)Performance measurement with the arbitrage pricing theory (1986)The predictability of returns on equity REITs and their co-movement with other assets (1992)The Integration of Commercial Real Estate Markets and Stock Markets (1999)Further Evidence on the Integration of REIT, Bond, and Stock Returns (2000)The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems (1993)Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors (1996)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure71,441 cited
  • 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
  • 1990Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives5,080 cited
  • 1985Corporate performance and managerial remuneration1,756 cited
  • 1985Executive compensation, management turnover, and firm performance1,209 cited
  • 1989Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers954 cited
  • 1979Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information942 cited
  • 1990Risk and Return on Real Estate: Evidence from Equity REITs365 cited
  • 1970Managerial Pay and Corporate Performance314 cited
  • 1980The Determinants of Executive Salaries: An Econometric Survey244 cited
  • 1993Return Properties of Equity REITs, Common Stocks, and Commercial Real Estate: A Comparison207 cited
  • 1985The self-serving management hypothesis174 cited
  • 1991Interindustry Differences in the Relation between Compensation and Firm Performance Variables139 cited
  • 1992Initial public offerings of equity securities135 cited
  • 1990REIT Advisor Performance111 cited
  • 1979

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Financial leverage clienteles
83 cited

Cited by

  • 2009Rewards and Performance of Swedish Real Estate Firms22 cited
  • 1998Executive Compensation in EREITs: EREIT Size is but One Determinant18 cited
  • 2011What Influences the Changes in REIT CEO Compensation? Evidence from Panel Data16 cited