SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
The electronic mail game: Strategic behavior under “almost common knowledge”
5 references·16 citing·46 second hop
The electronic mail game: Strategic behavior under “almost common knowledge” (1992)The electronic mail game: Strategic behav…Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model (2004)Games with Incomplete Informa…Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information (1985)Formulation of Bayesian analy…Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma (1982)Rational cooperation in the f…Agreeing to Disagree (1976)Agreeing to DisagreeConvention: A Philosophical Study. (1970)Convention: A Philosophical S…The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations (2017)The Behavioral Revolution and…Beliefs about Climate Beliefs: The Importance of Second-Order Opinions for Climate Politics (2017)Beliefs about Climate Beliefs…The psychology of coordination and common knowledge. (2014)The psychology of coordinatio…Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications (2013)Structural Models of Nonequil…Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information (2013)Robust Predictions in Games W…Signal to act : game theory in pragmatics (2009)Signal to act : game theory i…Talking Ourselves to Efficiency: Coordination in Inter‐Generational Minimum Effort Games with Private, Almost Common and Common Knowledge of Advice (2008)Talking Ourselves to Efficien…Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations (2007)Revisiting games of incomplet…A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements (2007)A Structure Theorem for Ratio…Arms Races and Negotiations (2004)Arms Races and NegotiationsEquilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities (2003)Equilibrium selection in glob…Public Information, Private Information, and the Multiplicity of Equilibria in Coordination Games (2002)Public Information, Private I…Communication and Coordination in Social Networks (2000)Communication and Coordinatio…CULTURE, CIRCLES, AND COMMERCIALS (1998)CULTURE, CIRCLES, AND COMMERC…p-Dominance and Belief Potential (1995)p-Dominance and Belief Potent…Negotiation Analysis: A Characterization and Review (1992)Negotiation Analysis: A Chara…Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk (1988)The Theory of Industrial Organization (1988)Breaking Deadlocks in International Institutional Negotiations: The WTO, Seattle, and Doha (2009)Networking under uncertainty: Concepts and research agenda (2010)Herbert Simon’s bounded rationality (2017)Theory of games and economic behavior (2019)The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money. (1936)Endogenous Depth of Reasoning (2015)American Economic Review (2019)Are Low Interest Rates Deflationary? A Paradox of Perfect-Foresight Analysis (2019)Monetary Policy, Bounded Rationality, and Incomplete Markets (2019)Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points (1968)Robust Mechanism Design (2005)Dynamic psychological games (2008)Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium (2016)The Strength of Weak Ties (1973)Getting a Job: A Study of Contacts and Careers. (1975)Diffusion of Behavior and Equilibrium Properties in Network Games (2007)Regime Change and Revolutionary Entrepreneurs (2010)Leadership: What It Means, What It Does, and What We Want to Know About It (2011)Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (1975)The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling (1986)The interdisciplinary study of coordination (1994)Rationalist explanations for war (1995)Reputation and imperfect information (1982)Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms (2000)ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition (2000)The Digitization of Word of Mouth: Promise and Challenges of Online Feedback Mechanisms (2003)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)Job Market Signaling (1973)An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining (1982)The Grammar of Society (2005)A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games (1988)Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities (1990)Potential Games (1996)Rethinking Multiple Equilibria in Macroeconomic Modeling (2000)Contagion of self-fulfilling financial crises due to diversification of investment portfolios (2004)Complementarities and Games: New Developments (2005)Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (1974)The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review (2007)The gateway belief model: A large-scale replication (2019)Americans experience a false social reality by underestimating popular climate policy support by nearly half (2022)Psychology of Climate Change (2022)Origins of the modern mind: three stages in the evolution of culture and cognition (1992)The Evolution of Conventions (1993)Social Theory of International Politics (1999)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1970Convention: A Philosophical Study.3,121 cited
  • 1976Agreeing to Disagree2,499 cited
  • 1982Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma2,494 cited
  • 2004Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model2,127 cited
  • 1985Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information774 cited

Cited by

  • 2013Structural Models of Nonequilibrium Strategic Thinking: Theory, Evidence, and Applications506 cited
  • 2000Communication and Coordination in Social Networks374 cited
  • 1992Negotiation Analysis: A Characterization and Review366 cited
  • 2003Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities342 cited
  • 2017Beliefs about Climate Beliefs: The Importance of Second-Order Opinions for Climate Politics305 cited
  • 2017The Behavioral Revolution and International Relations291 cited
  • 1995p-Dominance and Belief Potential226 cited
  • 2013Robust Predictions in Games With Incomplete Information206 cited
  • 2007A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability with Application to Robust Predictions of Refinements192 cited
  • 2009Signal to act : game theory in pragmatics

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

191 cited
  • 2004Arms Races and Negotiations182 cited
  • 2002Public Information, Private Information, and the Multiplicity of Equilibria in Coordination Games177 cited
  • 2014The psychology of coordination and common knowledge.170 cited
  • 2007Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations168 cited
  • 2008Talking Ourselves to Efficiency: Coordination in Inter‐Generational Minimum Effort Games with Private, Almost Common and Common Knowledge of Advice157 cited
  • 1998CULTURE, CIRCLES, AND COMMERCIALS137 cited