Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms

Abstract

I assume multiple types of players--“rational egoists,” as well as “conditional cooperators” and “willing punishers”--in models of nonmarket behavior. I use an indirect evolutionary approach to explain how multiple types of players could survive and flourish in social dilemma situations. Contextual variables that enhance knowledge about past behavior assist in explaining the origin of collective action. Among the important contextual variables are types of goods, types of groups, and rules that groups use to provide and allocate goods. Finally, I reexamine a series of design principles that were derived earlier from an examination of extensive case materials.

Cite this

Elinor Ostrom B (2000). Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms. The Journal of Economic Perspectives. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.14.3.137

@article{ostrom2000collective,
  title  = {Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms},
  author = {B, Elinor Ostrom},
  year   = {2000},
  journal = {The Journal of Economic Perspectives},
  doi    = {10.1257/jep.14.3.137}
}

Citations in this library

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 4,193 citations exist upstream.

References

Cited by