The Evolution of Cooperation
Abstract
Cooperation in organisms, whether bacteria or primates, has been a difficulty for evolutionary theory since Darwin. On the assumption that interactions between pairs of individuals occur on a probabilistic basis, a model is developed based on the concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy in the context of the Prisoner's Dilemma game. Deductions from the model, and the results of a computer tournament show how cooperation based on reciprocity can get started in an asocial world, can thrive while interacting with a wide range of other strategies, and can resist invasion once fully established. Potential applications include specific aspects of territoriality, mating, and disease.
Cite this
Robert Axelrod, William D. O. Hamilton (1981). The Evolution of Cooperation. Science. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.7466396
@article{robert1981the,
title = {The Evolution of Cooperation},
author = {Axelrod, Robert and Hamilton, William D. O.},
year = {1981},
journal = {Science},
doi = {10.1126/science.7466396}
}Citations in this library
Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 20,055 citations exist upstream.