COOPERATION, CONFLICT AND POWER IN THE ABSENCE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS

Stergios Skaperdas

578 citations0/0 files storedRePEc: Research Papers in Economics

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Abstract

This paper examines interaction in the absence of property rights when agents face a trade-off between productive and coercive activities. In this setting, conflict is not the necessary outcome of one-time interaction and cooperation is consistent with domination of one agent over another. Other things being equal, an agent's power, a well-defined concept in this paper, is inversely related to an agent's resources when resources are valued according to marginal-productivity theory. Some implications for the evolution of property rights are drawn. The model is applicable to a variety of situations in which directly unproductive activities are prevalent. Copyright 1992 by American Economic Association.

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