Bayesianism II: Applications and Criticisms

Kenny Easwaran

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Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophy, Science, and History Bayesian Modeling and Causal Inference

Abstract

Abstract In the first paper, I discussed the basic claims of Bayesianism (that degrees of belief are important, that they obey the axioms of probability theory, and that they are rationally updated by either standard or Jeffrey conditionalization) and the arguments that are often used to support them. In this paper, I will discuss some applications these ideas have had in confirmation theory, epistemology, and statistics, and criticisms of these applications.

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References

1959The Logic of Scientific Discovery.2002Knowledge and its Limits 1989Laws and Symmetry 1999The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory 1945I.—STUDIES IN THE LOGIC OF CONFIRMATION (I.)2004Putting Logic in its Place 1967Slightly More Realistic Personal Probability 1945The Two Concepts of Probability: The Problem of Probability

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2022Bias 2019Unsettled Thoughts 2012Normative theories of argumentation: are some norms better than others?2019How Do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?2015New theory about old evidence 2021Fragmentation and logical omniscience 2020Bayesian Epistemology 2013Ten Reasons to Care About the Sleeping Beauty Problem

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