SZodixStudyAcademic Library
ShelvesOpen access
Study · an open academic library·Metadata from OpenAlex (CC0)·Shelves·OpenAlex metadata, de-duplicated
Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism
16 references·16 citing·28 second hopsampled
Changing the Boston School Choice Mechanism (2006)Changing the Boston School Choice Mechani…The New York City High School Match (2005)The New York City High School…Matching with Contracts (2005)Matching with ContractsSchool Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach (2003)School Choice: A Mechanism De…Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis. (1992)Two Sided Matching: A Study i…The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory (1984)The Evolution of the Labor Ma…The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives (1982)The Economics of Matching: St…Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes (1982)Job Matching, Coalition Forma…Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm (1981)Machiavelli and the Gale-Shap…Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods (1977)Characterization of Satisfact…Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)Strategy-proofness and Arrow'…On cores and indivisibility (1974)On cores and indivisibilityIncentives in Teams (1973)Incentives in TeamsMultipart pricing of public goods (1971)Multipart pricing of public g…College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)College Admissions and the St…COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS,…The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic DesignThe Redesign of the Matching …Strategy-proofness in the Large (2018)Strategy-proofness in the Lar…Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof (2018)Stable matching mechanisms ar…Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: An approach from discrete convex analysis (2018)Designing matching mechanisms…Demand Analysis Using Strategic Reports: An Application to a School Choice Mechanism (2018)Demand Analysis Using Strateg…Research Design Meets Market Design: Using Centralized Assignment for Impact Evaluation (2017)Research Design Meets Market …Leveraging Lotteries for School Value-Added: Testing and Estimation* (2017)Leveraging Lotteries for Scho…Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory (2016)Matching with slot-specific p…Incentive Compatibility of Large Centralized Matching Markets (2016)Incentive Compatibility of La…Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: An experimental investigation (2016)Boston versus deferred accept…A theory of school-choice lotteries (2015)A theory of school-choice lot…The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach (2013)The “Boston” school-choice me…School Choice and Equity (2012)School Choice and EquityAn analysis of the German university admissions system (2012)An analysis of the German uni…Markets in Education (2010)Markets in EducationSchool Choice: The Case for the Boston Mechanism (2009)School Choice: The Case for t…College admissions with affirmative action (2005)College admissions with affir…61. Capitalism and Freedom (2002)Matching and Sorting in Online Dating (2010)The Combinatorial Assignment Problem: Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes (2011)Social Choice and Individual Values. (1951)The Theory of Committees and Elections. (1959)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage (1962)Social Theory, Social Research, and a Theory of Action (1986)Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term (1995)Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria (1998)The assignment game I: The core (1971)A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem (2001)Pairwise kidney exchange (2005)The Boston Public School Match (2005)Cores of convex games (1971)The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics (2002)Optimal Auction Design (1981)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)A Course in Game Theory (1994)A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks (1996)Multiagent systems: algorithmic, game-theoretic, and logical foundations (2009)Contrasting Computational Models of Mate Preference Integration Across 45 Countries (2019)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Putting Auction Theory to Work (2004)2. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research (1995)Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market (1993)The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework (1999)
this work references cited by second hop· second hop is a sample of the most-cited connections

References

  • 1961COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS7,719 cited
  • 1962College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage5,978 cited
  • 1973Incentives in Teams3,334 cited
  • 1971Multipart pricing of public goods3,266 cited
  • 1975Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions2,821 cited
  • 1992Two Sided Matching: A Study in Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis.1,625 cited
  • 2003School Choice: A Mechanism Design Approach1,572 cited
  • 1982Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes1,307 cited
  • 1974On cores and indivisibility1,254 cited
  • 1984The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory1,217 cited
  • 1982The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives897 cited
  • 1977Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods803 cited
  • 2005Matching with Contracts802 cited
  • n.d.The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of Economic Design757 cited
  • 1981Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm655 cited

Only edges whose both ends are imported exist here. Widen the year window, or show the whole map. Back to the work

  • 2005The New York City High School Match655 cited
  • Cited by

    • 2012School Choice and Equity189 cited
    • 2018Demand Analysis Using Strategic Reports: An Application to a School Choice Mechanism170 cited
    • 2010Markets in Education167 cited
    • 2016Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory164 cited
    • 2017Leveraging Lotteries for School Value-Added: Testing and Estimation*158 cited
    • 2005College admissions with affirmative action148 cited
    • 2012An analysis of the German university admissions system146 cited
    • 2017Research Design Meets Market Design: Using Centralized Assignment for Impact Evaluation144 cited
    • 2009School Choice: The Case for the Boston Mechanism114 cited
    • 2016Incentive Compatibility of Large Centralized Matching Markets104 cited
    • 2013The “Boston” school-choice mechanism: an axiomatic approach91 cited
    • 2018Stable matching mechanisms are not obviously strategy-proof87 cited
    • 2018Strategy-proofness in the Large86 cited
    • 2015A theory of school-choice lotteries85 cited
    • 2018Designing matching mechanisms under constraints: An approach from discrete convex analysis81 cited
    • 2016Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: An experimental investigation78 cited