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Continuity in auction design
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Continuity in auction design (1991)Continuity in auction designFull Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions (1988)Full Extraction of the Surplu…Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers (1984)Optimal Auctions with Risk Av…Optimal Auction Design (1981)Optimal Auction DesignOptimal prize allocation in contests: The role of negative prizes (2018)Optimal prize allocation in c…Vertical Contracting with Informational Opportunism (2015)Vertical Contracting with Inf…Genericity and Robustness of Full Surplus Extraction (2013)Genericity and Robustness of …An Introduction to Robust Mechanism Design (2013)An Introduction to Robust Mec…Robust Mechanism Design (2011)Robust Mechanism DesignA dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity (2009)A dynamic mechanism and surpl…Optimal state‐contingent regulation under limited liability (2006)Optimal state‐contingent regu…Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms (2005)Allocative and Informational …Infinite Dimensional Analysis (1999)Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities (1990)Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model (2004)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)The interdisciplinary study of coordination (1994)The Problem of Social Cost (1960)The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism (1970)Robust Mechanism Design and Social Preferences (2014)The all-pay auction with complete information and identity-dependent externalities (2014)Mechanism design and intentions (2016)Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms (1961)Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior (1989)The Design of Ambiguous Mechanisms (2016)Distributionally Robust Mechanism Design (2019)Uncertainty in Mechanism Design (2021)Robust Control and Model Uncertainty (2001)Robust virtual implementation: Toward a reinterpretation of the Wilson doctrine (2012)Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1987)American Economic Review (2019)Mechanism Design With Aftermarkets: Cutoff Mechanisms (2020)Governance of digital supply networks: Systematic literature review and research agenda (2023)The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests (2001)Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent (1985)How Auctions Work for Wine and Art (1989)The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics (2002)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Eliciting Informative Feedback: The Peer-Prediction Method (2005)Make Trade Not War? (2008)
this work references cited by second hop

References

  • 1981Optimal Auction Design5,938 cited
  • 1988Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions895 cited
  • 1984Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers748 cited

Cited by

  • 2011Robust Mechanism Design74 cited
  • 2009A dynamic mechanism and surplus extraction under ambiguity66 cited
  • 2005Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms58 cited
  • 2015Vertical Contracting with Informational Opportunism40 cited
  • 2018Optimal prize allocation in contests: The role of negative prizes35 cited
  • 2013Genericity and Robustness of Full Surplus Extraction33 cited
  • 2013An Introduction to Robust Mechanism Design30 cited
  • 2006Optimal state‐contingent regulation under limited liability28 cited

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