Genericity and Robustness of Full Surplus Extraction

Yi‐Chun Chen · Siyang Xiong

33 citations0/0 files storedEconometrica

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Auction Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Game Theory and Applications

Abstract

We study whether priors that admit full surplus extraction (FSE) are generic, an issue that becomes a gauge to evaluate the validity of the current mechanism design paradigm. We consider the space of priors on the universal type space, and thereby relax the assumption of a fixed finite number of types made by Crémer and McLean (1988). We show that FSE priors are topologically generic, contrary to the result of Heifetz and Neeman (2006) that FSE is generically impossible, both geometrically and measure-theoretically. Instead of using the BDP approach or convex combinations of priors adopted in Heifetz and Neeman (2006), we prove our genericity results by showing a robustness property of Crémer–McLean mechanisms.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 33 citations exist upstream.

References

1981Optimal Auction Design 1999Infinite Dimensional Analysis 1988Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions 1985Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information 2005Robust Mechanism Design 1992Correlated Information and Mecanism Design 1994Infinite Dimensional Analysis 2000Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation

Cited by

2013An Introduction to Robust Mechanism Design

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.