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Genericity and Robustness of Full Surplus Extraction
16 references·1 citing·36 second hop
Genericity and Robustness of Full Surplus Extraction (2013)Genericity and Robustness of Full Surplus…Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms (2007)Foundations of Dominant-Strat…Topologies on Types (2005)Topologies on TypesRobust Mechanism Design (2005)Robust Mechanism DesignOn the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design (2005)On the Generic (Im)Possibilit…The relevance of private information in mechanism design (2003)The relevance of private info…Genericity with Infinitely Many Parameters (2001)Genericity with Infinitely Ma…Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation (2000)Mechanism Design with Collusi…Infinite Dimensional Analysis (1999)Infinite Dimensional AnalysisVirtual Bayesian Implementation (1997)Virtual Bayesian Implementati…Infinite Dimensional Analysis (1994)Infinite Dimensional AnalysisVirtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information (1992)Virtual Implementation in Ite…Correlated Information and Mecanism Design (1992)Correlated Information and Me…Continuity in auction design (1991)Continuity in auction designFull Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions (1988)Full Extraction of the Surplu…Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information (1985)Formulation of Bayesian analy…Optimal Auction Design (1981)Optimal Auction DesignAn Introduction to Robust Mechanism Design (2013)An Introduction to Robust Mec…Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points (1968)Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III: Part I. The Basic Model (2004)Dynamic psychological games (2008)Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium (2016)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading (1983)The interdisciplinary study of coordination (1994)Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result (1973)Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions (1975)Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation (1988)Strategy-Proof Exchange (1995)Chapter 5 Implementation theory (2002)Approximately optimal mechanism design via differential privacy (2012)Incentives in Teams (1973)Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (1979)Credit Derivatives, Disintermediation, and Investment Decisions (2005)The impact of leniency and whistle-blowing programs on cartels (2006)Incentives and incomplete information (1979)Optimal Auctions with Ambiguity (2006)The Limits of ex post Implementation (2006)Calibrated Incentive Contracts (2013)Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model (1967)Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords (2006)An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design (2015)Robustness and Linear Contracts (2015)Incentives and Political Economy (2001)PUTTING AUCTION THEORY TO WORK (2004)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Eliciting Informative Feedback: The Peer-Prediction Method (2005)Make Trade Not War? (2008)Sovereign default and debt renegotiation (2009)Homo Moralis--Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching (2013)Quantifying Distributional Model Risk via Optimal Transport (2019)A Revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms (1999)Uncertainty and Risk in Financial Markets (2004)
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References

  • 1981Optimal Auction Design5,938 cited
  • 1999Infinite Dimensional Analysis1,120 cited
  • 1988Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions895 cited
  • 1985Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information774 cited
  • 2005Robust Mechanism Design616 cited
  • 1992Correlated Information and Mecanism Design408 cited
  • 1994Infinite Dimensional Analysis332 cited
  • 2000Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation318 cited
  • 1992Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information247 cited
  • 2007Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms196 cited
  • 2003The relevance of private information in mechanism design158 cited
  • 2005On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design113 cited
  • 2005Topologies on Types103 cited
  • 2001Genericity with Infinitely Many Parameters89 cited
  • 1991Continuity in auction design88 cited
  • 1997Virtual Bayesian Implementation61 cited

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Cited by

  • 2013An Introduction to Robust Mechanism Design30 cited