Sovereign Debt: A Review

Mark Aguiar · Manuel Amador

32 citations0/0 files storedNational Bureau of Economic Research

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Global Financial Crisis and Policies Fiscal Policies and Political Economy Economic theories and models

Abstract

In this chapter, we use a benchmark limited-commitment model to explore key issues in the economics of sovereign debt.After highlighting conceptual issues that distinguish sovereign debt as well as reviewing a number of empirical facts, we use the model to discuss debt overhang, risk sharing, and capital flows in an environment of limited enforcement.We also discuss recent progress on default and renegotiation; self-fulfilling debt crises; and incomplete markets and their quantitative implications.We conclude with a brief assessment of the current state of the literature and highlight some directions for future research.

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References

1981Debt with Potential Repudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis 2010This time is different: eight centuries of financial folly 1987Models of business cycles 2005Business cycles in emerging economies: the role of interest rates 2007Default Risk and Income Fluctuations in Emerging Economies 1989Why a Stubborn Conservative would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time- Inconsistent Preferences 1988Financing vs. forgiving a debt overhang 2011How Sovereign Is Sovereign Credit Risk?

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