References

• 1976Toward a More General Theory of Regulation4,771 cited
• 1984Constituent Interest and Congressional Voting542 cited
• 1997The Impact of Federal Spending on House Election Outcomes368 cited
• 2001Legislatures and Statutory Control of Bureaucracy287 cited
• 1983Bureaucrats, Legislators, and the Size of Government261 cited
• 1945The Endless Frontier, Report to the President on a Program for Postwar Scientific Research228 cited
• 2000Severing the Electoral Connection: Shirking in the Contemporary Congress184 cited
• 1987The Budget Process and the Size of the Budget155 cited
• 2000The Costs of Control: Legislators, Agencies, and Transaction Costs148 cited
• 1993Time series evidence on shirking in the U.S. House of Representatives144 cited
• 1962The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System: The Problem of Integration131 cited
• 1993On the (mis)measurement of legislator ideology and shirking112 cited
• 1994Strategy and Sophisticated Voting in the Senate104 cited
• 2000Constituency Characteristics and the "Guardian" Model of Appropriations Subcommittees, 1959-199881 cited
• 1997Congressional committees and the political economy of federal outlays