References

• 1986Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations1,227 cited
• 1985Credit Markets and the Control of Capital1,095 cited
• 1932For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?856 cited
• 1985The Co-operative Game Theory of the Firm.570 cited
• n.d.Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences456 cited
• 1931Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust429 cited
• 1987Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers402 cited
• 1999Employees and corporate governance242 cited
• 2000The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, Norms and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability101 cited
• 1991An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties96 cited
• 1989Do Union Wealth Concessions Explain Takeover Premiums? The Evidence on Contract Wages95 cited
• 1999Corporate Law and Social Norms91 cited
• 1995Union Rents as a Source of Takeover Gains among Target Shareholders49 cited
• 1993Human Capital ERA : Reconceptualizing Corporate Law to Facilitate Labor-Management Cooperation27 cited
• 2018Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law