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Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure · Study

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ChapterTheory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure

Michael C. Jensen1979

Chapter1979

Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure

Michael C. Jensen · William H. Meckling

3,372 citations·0/0 files stored·Rochester studies in economics and policy issues

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Corporate Finance and Governance Economic Theory and Institutions Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems

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References

1973The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities 1937The Nature of the Firm 1964CAPITAL ASSET PRICES: A THEORY OF MARKET EQUILIBRIUM UNDER CONDITIONS OF RISK*1960The Problem of Social Cost 1955A BEHAVIORAL MODEL OF RATIONAL CHOICE 1970Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work 1973A STATE‐PREFERENCE MODEL OF OPTIMAL FINANCIAL LEVERAGE

Cited by

1981An Economic Theory of Self-Control 2001THE ROLE OF FAMILY TIES IN AGENCY CONTRACTS.1983Agency Problems, Auditing, and the Theory of the Firm: Some Evidence 2016Corporate Governance and Sustainability Performance: Analysis of Triple Bottom Line Performance 1985Credit Markets and the Control of Capital 2007A Dynamic Model of Optimal Capital Structure 2002Market Discipline in the Governance of U.S. Bank Holding Companies: Monitoring vs. Influencing

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1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structurearticle · 7 shared references 1998Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structurepreprint · 7 shared references 2008Teoria da firma: comportamento dos administradores, custos de agência e estrutura de propriedadearticle · 6 shared references 2004Sustainable Corporate Financearticle · 5 shared references 2000The Theory of Corporate Finance: A Historical Overviewpreprint · 5 shared references 1982Towards an economic theory of the multiproduct firmarticle · 4 shared references

Details

Year1979

Typechapter

Published1979-01-01

VenueRochester studies in economics and policy issues

ISSN-L0924-6002

Languageen

Citations3,372

Files0 public / 0

ShelfCorporate Finance and Governance

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doi10.1007/978-94-009-9257-3_8

openalex_workW4239883852

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2002

Corporate Governance and Control