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Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives
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  • 2013Pure Intentionalism about Moods and Emotions87 cited
  • 2015No watershed for overflow: Recent work on the richness of consciousness78 cited
  • 2010Consciousness is Underived Intentionality65 cited
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  • 2007A Relationalist's Guide to Error About Color Perception53 cited
  • 2009The Knowledge Argument and Epiphenomenalism51 cited
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  • 2011The myth of phenomenological overflow48 cited
  • 2017Blur and perceptual content48 cited
  • 2006Indexicality and Self-Awareness43 cited
  • 2012On the Experientiality of Stories: A Follow-up on David Herman’s “Narrative Theory and the Intentional Stance”34 cited
  • 2012What is the Problem of Non-Existence?23 cited
  • 2015Taking the Intentionality of Perception Seriously: Why Phenomenology is Inescapable7 cited
  • 2001Individuals, Psychology, and the Mind0 cited

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