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How the U.S. Treasury Should Auction Its Debt

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References

1961COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS7,719 cited
1982A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding3,770 cited
1986Auctions and Bidding2,253 cited
1979Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem1,983 cited
1989Auctions and Bidding: A Primer851 cited
1981Resource Allocation Under Asymmetric Information434 cited
1983Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes211 cited

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2004Mechanisms for discrete optimization with rational agents36 cited
1995A uctioning the A irwave s: T he C ontest f or B roadband pcs S pectru m35 cited
2003Underpricing in Discriminatory and Uniform-Price Treasury Auctions35 cited
2021An Efficient Deep Distribution Network for Bid Shading in First-Price Auctions31 cited
2006The Relevance of a Choice of Auction Format in a Competitive Environment29 cited

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2020Bid Shading in The Brave New World of First-Price Auctions27 cited

2016Taking Orders and Taking Notes: Dealer Information Sharing in Treasury Markets17 cited

2021After the Accord9 cited