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Why People Obey the Law: Experimental Evidence from the Provision of Public Goods · Study

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PreprintWhy People Obey the Law: Experimental Evidence from the Provision of Public Goods

Jean‐Robert Tyran2001

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Preprintgreen2001

Why People Obey the Law: Experimental Evidence from the Provision of Public Goods

Jean‐Robert Tyran · Lars P. Feld

41 citations·0/0 files stored·SSRN Electronic Journal

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Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Legal and Constitutional Studies Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems

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References

1968Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach 1954The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure 2006Why People Obey the Law 2000Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms 1999The Economics and Econometrics of Active Labor Market Programs 19952. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research 2001Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment 1982Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma

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2007Speaking to Theorists and Searching for Facts: Tax Morale and Tax Compliance in Experiments 2005Tax Amnesties and Political Participation 2018The Provocative Effect of Law: Majority Nationalism and Minority Discrimination 2020It takes a village to build illegality: Minorities' noncompliance as manifestation of distrust

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2006Achieving Compliance when Legal Sanctions are Non‐deterrent*article · 10 shared references 2006Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulationpreprint · 9 shared references 2002Deterrence and Morale in Taxation: An Empirical Analysispreprint · 8 shared references 2003Expressive Law: Framing or Equilibrium Selection?preprint · 7 shared references 2007Obligations and cooperative behaviour in public good gamesarticle · 6 shared references 2010Punish in publicarticle · 6 shared references

Details

Year2001

Typepreprint

Published2001-01-01

VenueSSRN Electronic Journal

ISSN-L1556-5068

Languageen

Citations41

Files0 public / 0

ShelfExperimental Behavioral Economics Studies

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doi10.2139/ssrn.290231

openalex_workW1514729923

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