LLOYD'S AND THE MORAL ECONOMY OF INSURING AGAINST PIRACY

Abstract

In the context of heightened maritime piracy, the role of the maritime insurance industry is increasingly seen by governments as central to the management of this peril. What is not normally observed, however, is that the industry, while embracing piracy risks, actively seeks to transform the security environments under which issues such as piracy take place. In doing so, market entities like the Joint War Committee of the Lloyd's Market Association become important actors within a global security apparatus which normally escapes the attention of students of power relations. Employing the concept of moral economy proposed by Lorraine Daston, the effects of insuring against piracy are analysed to make explicit the micropractices of power through which insurers perform the markets of risk in which they operate. This article analyses the role of marine underwriters at the London market as ‘silent’ security professionals whose decisions have global effects.

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