Cooperation without Reputation: Experimental Evidence from Prisoner's Dilemma Games

Russell Cooper · Douglas V. DeJong · Robert Stanley Forsythe · Thomas W. Ross

396 citations0/0 files storedGames and Economic Behavior

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Game Theory and Applications Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation

Abstract

This paper investigates cooperative play in prisoner's dilemma games by designing an experiment to evaluate the ability of two leading theories of observed cooperation: reputation building and altruism. We analyze both one-shot and finitely repeated games to gauge the importance of these theories. We conclude that neither altruism nor reputation building alone can explain our observations. The reputation model is inconsistent with play in both one-shots and finitely repeated games while the model with altruism is unable to explain observed play in the finitely repeated games.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C72, C92.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 396 citations exist upstream.

References

1982Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma 1994Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments 1986The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information 1986On the private provision of public goods 1992An Experimental Study of the Centipede Game

Cited by

2018The dark core of personality.2013Homo Moralis--Preference Evolution Under Incomplete Information and Assortative Matching 2010Institutions and Behavior: Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Democracy 2002Reputation and Reciprocity: Consequences for the Labour Relation 2004Social status and group norms: Indirect reciprocity in a repeated helping experiment 19955. Industrial Organization: A Survey of Laboratory Research 2012Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World 2012The essential role of ritual in the transmission and reinforcement of social norms.

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.