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Sabotage in Tournaments: Making the Beautiful Game a Bit Less Beautiful
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References

  • 1991Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design6,042 cited
  • 1999The Provision of Incentives in Firms3,337 cited
  • 1979Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts3,033 cited
  • 1975On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B.1,584 cited
  • 1994The Firm as an Incentive System1,348 cited
  • 1989Pay Equality and Industrial Politics1,205 cited
  • 1985Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments1,137 cited
  • 1992Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement1,085 cited
  • 1998Incentives in Organizations1,023 cited
  • 1983A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts1,002 cited
  • 2003Rotten Apples: An Investigation of the Prevalence and Predictors of Teacher Cheating865 cited
  • 2000The Sports Business as a Labor Market Laboratory530 cited
  • 1987Tournaments and Piece Rates: An Experimental Study496 cited
  • 1991Incentives to Help in Multi-Agent Situations464 cited
  • 2002Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer415 cited
  • 2001Minimax Play at Wimbledon

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