Mind in a physical world: an essay on the mind-body problem and mental causation

Abstract

Part 1 The mind-body problem - where we now are: supervenience, realization and emergence supervenience is not a mind-body theory the layered model and mereological supervenience physical realization physical realization explains mind-body supervenience. Part 2 The many problems of mental causation: three problems of mental causation the supervenience argument, or Descartes's revenge Searle, Fodor and the supervenience argument Block's worries about second-order properties. Part 3 Mental causation - the backlash and free lunches: unavoidability of metaphysics - the exclusion problem do counterfactuals help? programme explanation and supervenient causation does the problem of mental causation generalize? properties - levels and orders. Part 4 Reduction and reductionism - a new look: Nagel reduction - troubles with bridge laws the functional model of reduction functional properties versus functional concepts multiple realization again the supervenience argument revisited the options - good news and bad news.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 593 citations exist upstream.