ON THE ROBUSTNESS OF PRIVATE LEADERSHIP IN MIXED DUOPOLY

Toshihiro Matsumura · Akira Ogawa

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Merger and Competition Analysis Game Theory and Applications Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies

Abstract

We investigate a mixed duopoly where a state‐owned public enterprise competes against a profit‐maximising private enterprise. We analyse whether private leadership or public leadership is robust in the observable delay game. We find that private leadership is always risk dominant. We also investigate how ownership structure in a public firm affects the equilibrium distribution of roles. We find that the roles are as follows: (1) Cournot, when the degree of privatisation is low, (2) private leadership, when it is middle, (3) both private leadership and public leadership, when it is high. The result implies that private leadership is again more robust.

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References

1988A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games 1989A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games.1990Endogenous timing in duopoly games: Stackelberg or cournot equilibria 1998Partial privatization in mixed duopoly 1996A Mixed Oligopoly in the Presence of Foreign Private Firms 1998Mixed Oligopoly, Privatization, and Strategic Trade Policy 2005Mixed Oligopoly at Free Entry Markets 1998Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly

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