An Experimental Investigation of Excludable Public Goods

Kurtis J. Swope

39 citations0/0 files storedExperimental Economics

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Game Theory and Voting Systems Economic Policies and Impacts

Abstract

Abstract This paper extends the research on incentive compatible institutions for the provision of public goods by imposing a minimum contribution that must be met in order for an individual to enjoy the benefits of the public good. Excluding individuals who do not contribute at least the minimum transforms the linear n-player pure public goods game to an n-player coordination game with multiple, Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. The experimental results show that exclusion increases contributions to the public good in most cases. However, an increase in contributions may not be sufficient to increase social welfare because there is a welfare cost to excluding individuals when the good is non-rival. Furthermore, exclusion can decrease both contributions and welfare in environments in which individuals fail to coordinate their contributions. The results are sensitive to the minimum contribution requirement and to the relative returns from the public and private alternatives.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 39 citations exist upstream.

References

1954The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure 19952. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research 2020The Handbook of Experimental Economics 2002Cooperation in public-goods experiments: kindness or confusion?1984Divergent evidence on free riding: An experimental examination of possible explanations 1984Participation and the provision of discrete public goods: a strategic analysis 1997Anomalous behavior in public goods experiments: How much 1993Social Welfare, Cooperators' Advantage, and the Option of Not Playing the Game

Cited by

2015Phasing out mercury through collective action in artisanal gold mining: Evidence from a framed field experiment 2005Ostracism and the Provision of a Public Good - Experimental Evidence 2012Does a membership fee foster successful public good provision? An experimental investigation of the provision of a step-level collective good

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.