A Simple Mechanism for the Efficient Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence

Josef Falkinger · Ernst Fehr · Simon Gächter · Rudolf Winter‐Ebmer

338 citations0/0 files storedAmerican Economic Review

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies Game Theory and Voting Systems Economic Policies and Impacts

Abstract

A Simple Mechanism for the Efficient Provision of Public Goods: Experimental Evidence by Josef Falkinger, Ernst Fehr, Simon Gächter and Rudolf Winter-Ember. Published in volume 90, issue 1, pages 247-264 of American Economic Review, March 2000

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 338 citations exist upstream.

References

1999A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation 2007z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments 1954The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure 1973Incentives in Teams 1971Multipart pricing of public goods 19952. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research 1996The Theory of Externalities, Public Goods, and Club Goods 1986On the private provision of public goods

Cited by

2000Fairness and Retaliation 2000Fairness, incentives, and contractual choices 2002Provision Point Mechanisms and Field Validity Tests of Contingent Valuation 2003Young, Selfish and Male: Field Evidence of Social Preferences 2008Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Good Experiments 2012Gun for hire: Delegated enforcement and peer punishment in public goods provision 2021

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.