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Epistemology: An Anthology
0 references·16 citing·56 second hopsampled
Epistemology: An Anthology (2019)Epistemology: An AnthologyKnowledge as Acceptable Testimony (2017)Knowledge as Acceptable Testi…THE LEGEND OF THE JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF ANALYSIS (2015)THE LEGEND OF THE JUSTIFIED T…Vicious minds (2013)Vicious mindsPeer Disagreement, Evidence, and Well-Groundedness (2013)Peer Disagreement, Evidence, …Virtue Epistemology and the Philosophy of Education (2012)Virtue Epistemology and the P…Rationalistic Epistemology (2012)Rationalistic EpistemologyParasitism and Disjunctivism in Nyāya Epistemology (2012)Parasitism and Disjunctivism …Believing For a Reason (2011)Believing For a ReasonThe Ontology of Epistemic Reasons (2009)The Ontology of Epistemic Rea…Why There Are No Epistemic Duties (2007)Why There Are No Epistemic Du…Why (Wittgensteinian) Contextualism Is Not Relativism (2007)Why (Wittgensteinian) Context…Entitlement and rationality (2007)Entitlement and rationalityCan Testimony Generate Knowledge? (2006)Can Testimony Generate Knowle…Moorean Facts and Belief Revision, or Can the Skeptic Win? (2005)Moorean Facts and Belief Revi…How Hard Are the Sceptical Paradoxes? (2004)How Hard Are the Sceptical Pa…Semaphoronts, cladograms and the roots of total evidence (2003)Semaphoronts, cladograms and …Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge (1976)Knowledge and the Flow of Information. (1983)Philosophical Explanations. (1983)ON TESTIMONY AND TRANSMISSION (2014)Disagreement and the division of epistemic labor (2018)Scientific Testimony (2022)The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement (2005)Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News (2007)Reflection and Disagreement (2007)A Dilemma for Calibrationism (2014)How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher‐Order Evidence (2016)Formulating Independence (2019)Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. (1955)Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? (1963)On the Plurality of Worlds (1986)Can We Believe the Error Theory? (2013)Knowing Our Limits (2019)Moral Knowledge (2019)Philosophical Writings of Peirce (1955)Actions, Reasons, and Causes (1963)Science, Perception and Reality (1964)The problem of the basing relation (2012)Unreliable Knowledge (2013)Epistemic Reasons II: Basing (2016)On Certainty (1969)Elusive knowledge (1996)Knowledge and Lotteries (2003)Basic Justification and the Moorean Response to the Skeptic (2007)Wittgenstein and the groundlessness of our believing (2011)Epistemic Reasons I: Normativity (2016)Reason, Truth and History (1981)Knowledge and the Internal (1995)Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge (2001)The Cambridge history of philosophy, 1870-1945 (2004)Philosophy of Linguistics (2005)Nyāya Perceptual Theory: Disjunctivism or Anti-Individualism? (2013)Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1980)Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (2008)Deep disagreement and hinge epistemology (2018)What is Deep Disagreement? (2018)Wittgensteinian Hinge Epistemology and Deep Disagreement (2018)Intentionality (1983)Knowledge and Its Limits (2000)Skeptical Arguments (2004)Either/Or (2008)Epistemic Angst (2016)The Logic of Scientific Discovery. (1959)Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2015)The Gettier Intuition from South America to Asia (2017)Epistemic Trespassing (2019)Naming and Necessity (1972)The Hidden Dimension (1973)Beliefs about beliefs: Representation and constraining function of wrong beliefs in young children's understanding of deception (1983)The points of concepts: their types, tensions, and connections (2019)Belief, Agency, and Knowledge (2022)The Ethics of Conceptualization (2025)
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Cited by

  • 2007Entitlement and rationality180 cited
  • 2005Moorean Facts and Belief Revision, or Can the Skeptic Win?151 cited
  • 2015THE LEGEND OF THE JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF ANALYSIS126 cited
  • 2004How Hard Are the Sceptical Paradoxes?118 cited
  • 2012Parasitism and Disjunctivism in Nyāya Epistemology108 cited
  • 2007Why (Wittgensteinian) Contextualism Is Not Relativism106 cited
  • 2013Peer Disagreement, Evidence, and Well-Groundedness98 cited
  • 2011Believing For a Reason90 cited
  • 2006Can Testimony Generate Knowledge?88 cited
  • 2017Knowledge as Acceptable Testimony88 cited
  • 2009The Ontology of Epistemic Reasons85 cited
  • 2012Virtue Epistemology and the Philosophy of Education75 cited
  • 2013Vicious minds72 cited
  • 2007Why There Are No Epistemic Duties68 cited
  • 2012Rationalistic Epistemology65 cited
  • 2003Semaphoronts, cladograms and the roots of total evidence61 cited

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