Article2011

The Joint Effects of Corporate Governance and Regulation on the Disclosure of Manager‐Adjusted Non‐GAAP Earnings in the US

89 citations0/0 files storedJournal of Business Finance &amp Accounting

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Auditing, Earnings Management, Governance Corporate Finance and Governance Corporate Governance and Financial Management

Abstract

Abstract: This paper examines the joint effects of corporate governance and regulation by the Securities and Exchange Commission on the disclosure of manager‐adjusted non‐GAAP (or pro forma) earnings numbers in the United States. We provide evidence that prior to Regulation G investors were misled by disclosures of non‐GAAP earnings, but only for disclosures made by firms with weaker corporate governance. After the SEC intervention there is no evidence that investors were still being misled. Furthermore, the effect of the intervention applied to both adjustments that are ex ante recurring as well as to adjustments that just meet or beat analysts’ forecasts.

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References

1993Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds 2002Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management 1996Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC*1997An Empirical Analysis of the Relation between the Board of Director Composition and Financial Statement Fraud 1998The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment Behavior 2004Board characteristics, accounting report integrity, and the cost of debt 2002The Relation between Auditors' Fees for Nonaudit Services and Earnings Management 1988Ownership structure and voting on antitakeover amendments

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