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Transfer Pricing, Incentive Compensation and Tax Avoidance in a Multi-Division Firm
16 references·0 citing·32 second hop
Transfer Pricing, Incentive Compensation and Tax Avoidance in a Multi-Division Firm (1998)Transfer Pricing, Incentive Compensation …Performance Measure Congruity and Diversity in Multi-Task Principal/Agent Relations. (1994)Performance Measure Congruity…Accounting earnings and top executive compensation (1993)Accounting earnings and top e…An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1992)An Analysis of the Principal-…Transfer Pricing and Organizational Form (1991)Transfer Pricing and Organiza…Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design (1991)Multitask Principal–Agent Ana…Stock prices and top management changes (1988)Stock prices and top manageme…Outside directors and CEO turnover (1988)Outside directors and CEO tur…Managerial competition, information costs, and corporate governance (1988)Managerial competition, infor…The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (1987)The Economic Institutions of …Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives (1987)Aggregation and Linearity in …The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration (1986)The Costs and Benefits of Own…An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation of Corporate Executives (1986)An Empirical Investigation of…An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem (1983)An Analysis of the Principal-…Moral Hazard in Teams (1982)Moral Hazard in TeamsMarkets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Markets and Hierarchies: Anal…On the Economics of Transfer Pricing (1956)On the Economics of Transfer …Moral Hazard and Observability (1979)Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications (1981)Agency costs and innovation (1989)Risk Taking by Mutual Funds as a Response to Incentives (1997)The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (2001)Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm (1980)Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems (1993)A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature (2001)The Nature of the Firm (1937)The Problem of Social Cost (1960)Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process (1978)Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives (1991)The quality of government (1999)The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead (2000)The Economic Theory of Agency: The Principal's Problem. (1973)Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation (1988)Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective (1999)The choice of organizational form The case of franchising (1987)Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity (2000)Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation (2003)Large Shareholders and Corporate Control (1986)Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring (1984)General purpose technologies ‘Engines of growth’? (1995)A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action Presidential Address, American political Science Association, 1997 (2010)The Commitment-Trust Theory of Relationship Marketing (1994)Dynamic capabilities and strategic management (1997)Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms (1986)Incentives in Principal-Agent Relationships (1991)The Tenuous Trade‐off between Risk and Incentives (2002)
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References

  • 1987The Economic Institutions of Capitalism14,787 cited
  • 1976Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications.13,381 cited
  • 1986The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration9,369 cited
  • 1991Multitask Principal–Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design6,042 cited
  • 1982Moral Hazard in Teams4,992 cited
  • 1988Outside directors and CEO turnover4,251 cited
  • 1987Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives2,870 cited
  • 1983An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem2,127 cited
  • 1992An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem1,913 cited
  • 1988Stock prices and top management changes1,572 cited
  • 1994Performance Measure Congruity and Diversity in Multi-Task Principal/Agent Relations.914 cited
  • 1993Accounting earnings and top executive compensation763 cited
  • 1986An Empirical Investigation of the Relative Performance Evaluation of Corporate Executives677 cited
  • 1988Managerial competition, information costs, and corporate governance586 cited
  • 1956On the Economics of Transfer Pricing487 cited

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1991
Transfer Pricing and Organizational Form
304 cited

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