The Epistemology of Disagreement

Abstract

How should we respond to disagreement with people we regard as our peers?1 It is an important feature of our intellectual lives that we take such disagreements seriously, that we seek out alternate perspectives on our ideas and compare our reactions to evidence with other investigators. We undeniably benefit from subjecting our views to others ’ scrutiny, and it is no accident that the majority of cranks and crackpots work outside of any community of serious investigators. Yet there still remains a question of how it is that disagreement makes a difference. When we disagree with someone and they provide us with what we recognize as a good argument that we have reasoned incorrectly, this gives us reason to revise our views. This fact leaves the question of how we should react when someone disagrees with us and we are not moved to accept some argument that they offer. In that case, should we take the disagreement itself as a reason to revise our views?2 One extreme is the position that disagreement itself gives us no reason 1Theories of disagreement differ on how they define peerhood. I will not adopt any

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