Self‐Reinforcing and Self‐Frustrating Decisions

Abstract

There is a sense of the term ‘ought’ according to which what a person ought to do depends not on how the world is, but on how the person believes the world to be. Philosophers typically isolate this as their intended sense of the term by talking of what people ‘subjectively ought’ to do. Suppose, for example, that you are offered hors d'oeuvres at a fancy party. They look delicious, you are hungry, and you wish to please your host. However, unbeknownst to you, they are riddled with a lethal strain of botulism. A philosopher may say that, in light of your beliefs, you subjectively ought to eat the hors d'oeuvres, though the consequences of your doing so will be disastrous. Our focus here will be on theories of the subjective ought that imply Decision Dependence In some cases what you subjectively ought to do at a certain time depends on what you believe you will do at that time.

Cite this work

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 58 citations exist upstream.

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.