Some Counterexamples to Causal Decision Theory

Andy Egan

164 citations0/0 files storedThe Philosophical Review

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Philosophical Ethics and Theory Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Abstract

Many philosophers (myself included) have been converted to causal decision theory by something like the following line of argument: Evidential decision theory endorses irrational courses of action in a range of examples, and endorses “an irrational policy of managing the news”.2 These are fatal problems for evidential decision theory.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 164 citations exist upstream.

References

1965The Logic of Decision 1995On Conditionals 1981Causal decision theory 1969Newcomb’s Problem and Two Principles of Choice 2003What Conditional Probability Could Not Be 1978Counterfactuals and Two Kinds of Expected Utility 2016The Paradoxes of Time Travel 1977Where Luce and Krantz do really generalize Savage's decision model

Cited by

2013Epistemic Decision Theory 2011Regret and instability in causal decision theory 2012Causation, Chance, and the Rational Significance of Supernatural Evidence 2009Decision-Theoretic Paradoxes as Voting Paradoxes 2011Gandalf’s solution to the Newcomb problem 2016DELIBERATION WELCOMES PREDICTION 2015Self‐Reinforcing and Self‐Frustrating Decisions

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.