this work references cited by second hopReferences
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- 1984Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have18,936 cited
- 1986Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers17,216 cited
- 1986Large Shareholders and Corporate Control8,403 cited
- 1988Management ownership and market valuation6,910 cited
- 1990Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value4,311 cited
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