A Test of the Agency Theory of Managerial Ownership, Corporate Leverage, and Corporate Dividends

Claire E. Crutchley

517 citations0/0 files storedFinancial Management

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Corporate Finance and Governance Financial Analysis and Corporate Governance Corporate Taxation and Avoidance

Abstract

A Test of the Agency Theory of Managerial Ownership, Corporate Leverage, and CorporateDividends Author(s): Claire E. Crutchley and Robert S. Hansen Source: Financial Management, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Winter, 1989), pp. 36-46 Published by: Wiley on behalf of the Financial Management Association International Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3665795 Accessed: 31-03-2015 15:42 UTC

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 517 citations exist upstream.

References

1976Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure 1958The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment 1977Determinants of corporate borrowing 1980Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm 1984The Capital Structure Puzzle 1961Dividend Policy, Growth, and the Valuation of Shares 1985The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences 1977The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signalling Approach

Cited by

2005Trade-Off and Pecking Order Theories of Debt 1999Ownership and board structures in publicly traded corporations 1999Founding Family Control and Capital Structure: The Risk of Loss of Control and the Aversion to Debt 2002Capital structure and its determinants in the UK - a decompositional analysis 2008Trade-Off and Pecking Order Theories of Debt**We thank Long Chen, Sudipto Dasgupta, Espen Eckbo, Chris Hennessy, Jay Ritter, Michael Roberts, Tan Wang, and Jaime Zender for comments and helpful discussions. Murray Frank thanks Piper Jaffray for financial support. Vidhan Goyal thanks the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region for financial support (Project No. 6489/06H). The literature on capital structure is vast, containing hundreds of papers, and so we cannot hope to cover it all. Inevitably, we have left out a great deal, much of it very important. As such, we apologize in advance for our inevitable oversights. Even more than usual, it must be stressed that this survey reflects only our views.

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.