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Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement
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Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disagreement (1995)Ratifiable Mechanisms: Learning from Disa…Dispute Resolution Institutions and Strategic Militarization (2018)Dispute Resolution Institutio…Mechanism design with collusive supervision (2008)Mechanism design with collusi…Mechanism design goes to war: peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types (2008)Mechanism design goes to war:…Bidding rings and the winner's curse (2008)Bidding rings and the winner'…Auction design in the presence of collusion (2008)Auction design in the presenc…Chapter 32 An Empirical Perspective on Auctions (2007)Chapter 32 An Empirical Persp…Efficient collusion in optimal auctions (2006)Efficient collusion in optima…An Empirical Perspective on Auctions (2006)An Empirical Perspective on A…A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments (2006)A general characterization of…A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods (1999)A Characterization of Interim…The Firm as a Multicontract Organization (1997)The Firm as a Multicontract O…Two-Person Cooperative Games (1953)Compliance, identification, and internalization three processes of attitude change (1958)Rationalist explanations for war (1995)Optimal Auction Design (1981)Efficient and Durable Decision Rules with Incomplete Information (1983)Collusive Bidder Behavior at Single-Object Second-Price and English Auctions (1987)The economics of club bidding and value creation (2013)Weak cartels and collusion-proof auctions (2018)COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERS (1961)An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation (1971)Supermodular mechanism design (2010)Optimal Crowdfunding Design (2016)Incentives and incomplete information (1979)Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions (1993)Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature (1999)The Nature of the Firm (1937)Markets and Hierarchies (1975)The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration (1986)Multiprincipal Agency Relationships as Implied by Product Market Competition (1997)Authority Relinquishment in Agency Relationships (2016)Decoupling in hybrid arrangements: Insights from the Australian defence industry (2024)Hierarchies and Bureaucracies: On the Role of Collusion in Organizations (1986)The Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture (1991)A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation (1993)Multi-Contracting Mechanism Design (2013)Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal: Private Values with Transferable Utility (2014)Financing smallholder agriculture: An experiment with agent-intermediated microloans in India (2017)A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition (1977)A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding (1982)Detecting abnormal and collusive bids in capped tendering (2013)Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective (2015)Collusion in Auctions with Constrained Bids: Theory and Evidence from Public Procurement (2018)Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance. (1971)Nonparametric estimation of first-price auctions with risk-averse bidders (2018)The industrial organization of financial markets (2021)Private provision of a discrete public good: efficient equilibria in the private-information contribution game (2007)On the Legitimacy of Coercion for the Financing of Public Goods (2009)Bounds on revenue distributions in counterfactual auctions with reserve prices (2011)Competitive bidding in Medicare Advantage: Effect of benchmark changes on plan bids (2013)A STUDY OF PARTICIPATION IN DYNAMIC AUCTIONS (2014)
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  • 1999A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods80 cited
  • 1997The Firm as a Multicontract Organization71 cited
  • 2008Bidding rings and the winner's curse65 cited
  • 2008Mechanism design with collusive supervision62 cited
  • 2006An Empirical Perspective on Auctions58 cited
  • 2006A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments47 cited
  • 2018Dispute Resolution Institutions and Strategic Militarization41 cited
  • 2008Auction design in the presence of collusion41 cited
  • 2007Chapter 32 An Empirical Perspective on Auctions36 cited
  • 2006Efficient collusion in optimal auctions29 cited
  • 2008Mechanism design goes to war: peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types28 cited

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