Epistemic Contextualism: A Normative Approach

Abstract

Abstract In hisKnowledge andPracticalInterestsJasonStanley argues that the view he defends, which he calls interest‐relative invariantism, is better supported by certain cases than epistemic contextualism. In this article I argue that a version of epistemic contextualism that emphasizes the role played by the ascriber's practical interests in determining the truth‐conditions of her ‘knowledge’ ascriptions – a view that I call interests contextualism – is better supported byStanley's cases than interest‐relative invariantism or other versions of epistemic contextualism. My main aim is to show that interests contextualism is a viable, if often over‐looked, alternative to the usual positions in the contemporary debate.

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