PHILOSOPHICAL INTUITIONS: THEIR TARGET, THEIR SOURCE, AND THEIR EPISTEMIC STATUS

Alvin I. Goldman

317 citations0/0 files storedGrazer Philosophische Studien

No readable copy stored yet — this record is metadata only.

No open-access location is known for this record yet.

Literature note Cite in a project Citation map

Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics Philosophical Ethics and Theory Philosophy and Theoretical Science

Abstract

Intuitions play a critical role in analytical philosophical activity. But do they qualify as genuine evidence for the sorts of conclusions philosophers seek? Skeptical arguments against intuitions are reviewed, and a variety of ways of trying to legitimate them are considered. A defense is off ered of their evidential status by showing how their evidential status can be embedded in a naturalistic framework.

Paper brief

Loading…

Cite this work

Citation unavailable for this work.

BibTeX RIS CSL-JSON

No public copy is stored for this record, so only the metadata is cited.

Citations in this library

Citation map →

Stored only when both papers are in the corpus — 317 citations exist upstream.

References

1963Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?1999From metaphysics to ethics: a defence of conceptual analysis 1989Epistemology and Cognition.2002Knowledge and its Place in Nature 2012Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions 1998Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy

Cited by

2006Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy 2007How to Challenge Intuitions Empirically Without Risking Skepticism 2015The Intellectual Given 2010Are philosophers expert intuiters?2014Gender and Philosophical Intuition*2012Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers 2014Philosophical Expertise 2011Putting the trolley in order: Experimental philosophy and the loop case

Explore the map →

Papers that cite the same references — the relational fallback while embeddings are still backfilling.

Imported from OpenAlex (CC0) — nothing here is generated.