Guise of the Good

Abstract

Abstract The “guise of the good” (GG) thesis concerns the nature of human motivation and intentional action (seeAction; Intention). It is generally understood as the view that everything that an agent desires (seeDesire; Pro‐attitudes) or pursues is in some way thought to be good. In its most sweeping version, the thesis applies to any mental state capable of motivating the agent; that is, every state that can motivate the agent must involve some kind of thought of its object as good. An even more radical version of GG also accepts the converse claim: namely, that all evaluative judgments motivate.

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