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Inter-Governmental Fiscal Relations: The Facilitator of Fiscal Decentralization
16 references·0 citing·38 second hop
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References

  • 1956A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures13,318 cited
  • 1981The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution1,720 cited
  • 1999Theories of Tax Competition1,661 cited
  • 1998Development, Geography, and Economic Theory1,282 cited
  • 1995Development, Geography, and Economic Theory1,093 cited
  • 1998Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint813 cited
  • 1996Tax competition and Leviathan596 cited
  • 1999Federalism and the Soft Budget Constraint546 cited
  • 1982Efficiency and Equalization Payments in a Federal System of Government: A Synthesis and Extension of Recent Results422 cited
  • 1994The reform of intergovernmental fiscal relations in developing and emerging market economies389 cited
  • 1981A Critique of Tiebout's Theory of Local Public Expenditures385 cited
  • 1996Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Moral Hazard374 cited
  • 1991Income Redistribution in a Common Labor Market366 cited
  • 1976The Marginal Cost of Public Funds366 cited
  • 1996Federal Fiscal Constitutions: Risk Sharing and Redistribution346 cited
  • 1974Public goods, efficiency, and regional fiscal equalization

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