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L'entreprise publique est-elle nécessairement moins efficace?
16 references·1 citing·40 second hop
L'entreprise publique est-elle nécessairement moins efficace? (1997)L'entreprise publique est-elle nécessaire…Vers une théorie du gouvernement des entreprises (1996)Vers une théorie du gouvernem…A Survey of Corporate Governance (1996)A Survey of Corporate Governa…Les nouvelles théories de l'entreprise (1995)Les nouvelles théories de l'e…The Financial and Operating Performance of Newly Privatized Firms: An International Empirical Analysis (1994)The Financial and Operating P…Productivity Growth and Firm Ownership: An Analytical and Empirical Investigation (1994)Productivity Growth and Firm …The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems (1993)The Modern Industrial Revolut…Economics, Organization and Management. (1993)Economics, Organization and M…Ownership versus competition: Efficiency in public enterprise (1992)Ownership versus competition:…Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm (1990)Property Rights and the Natur…Ownership and Performance in Competitive Environments: A Comparison of the Performance of Private, Mixed, and State-Owned Enterprises (1989)Ownership and Performance in …The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration (1986)The Costs and Benefits of Own…Separation of Ownership and Control (1983)Separation of Ownership and C…Property Rights, Transaction Costs, and X-Efficiency: An Essay in Economic Theory (1983)Property Rights, Transaction …Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm (1980)Agency Problems and the Theor…Implications of Property Rights for Government Investment Choices (1969)Implications of Property Righ…The Modern Corporation and Private Property (1933)The Modern Corporation and Pr…Quels enjeux théoriques et méthodologiques de la théorie de la gouvernance partenariale ? La privatisation comme illustration (2002)Quels enjeux théoriques et mé…Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure (1976)Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation (1980)Economic Perspectives on Privatization (1991)The institutional environment for infrastructure investment (2002)China share issue privatization: the extent of its success (2003)On the Existence of an Optimal Capital Structure: Theory and Evidence (1984)Politicians and Firms (1994)Political Connections and Corporate Bailouts (2006)Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance, and Post-IPO performance of China's newly partially privatized firms☆ (2007)The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences (1985)Management ownership and market valuation (1988)The Theory of Industrial Organization (1988)Chapter 21 Not-for-profit ownership and hospital behavior (2000)Hospital ownership and cost and quality of care: is there a dime’s worth of difference? (2001)Does Ownership Type Matter for Corporate Social Responsibility? (2012)The Nature of the Firm (1937)Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications. (1976)Production, Information Costs and Economic Organization (1996)Formal and Real Authority in Organizations (1997)Does function follow organizational form? Evidence from the lending practices of large and small banks (2005)Unbundling Institutions (2005)The Problem of Social Cost (1960)Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process (1978)Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives (1991)The quality of government (1999)The New Institutional Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead (2000)Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control (1965)A Survey of Corporate Governance (1997)Dynamic capabilities and strategic management (1997)Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers (1986)Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives (1990)Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers (1996)Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors (1996)Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance (1999)An Integrative Model Of Organizational Trust (1995)Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms (1996)Upper Echelons Theory: An Update (2007)Law and Finance (1998)Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review (1989)Strategic assets and organizational rent (1993)
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References

  • 1983Separation of Ownership and Control19,446 cited
  • 1980Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm10,540 cited
  • 1986The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration9,369 cited
  • 1993The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of Internal Control Systems8,544 cited
  • 1933The Modern Corporation and Private Property7,361 cited
  • 1990Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm5,407 cited
  • 1993Economics, Organization and Management.4,644 cited
  • 1994The Financial and Operating Performance of Newly Privatized Firms: An International Empirical Analysis1,416 cited
  • 1989Ownership and Performance in Competitive Environments: A Comparison of the Performance of Private, Mixed, and State-Owned Enterprises1,132 cited
  • 1992Ownership versus competition: Efficiency in public enterprise490 cited
  • 1996A Survey of Corporate Governance286 cited
  • 1994Productivity Growth and Firm Ownership: An Analytical and Empirical Investigation273 cited
  • 1983Property Rights, Transaction Costs, and X-Efficiency: An Essay in Economic Theory251 cited
  • 1995Les nouvelles théories de l'entreprise132 cited
  • 1996Vers une théorie du gouvernement des entreprises

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122 cited
  • 1969Implications of Property Rights for Government Investment Choices109 cited
  • Cited by

    • 2002Quels enjeux théoriques et méthodologiques de la théorie de la gouvernance partenariale ? La privatisation comme illustration5 cited