Grounding desire and motivated behavior: A theoretical framework and review of empirical evidence

Abstract

Experiencing and dealing with desire is a central part of human existence. Whether it is for food, drink, sex, fame, social connectedness, or world peace, our desires shape and energize much of our daily life. A large literature, especially in social and health psychology, has focused on the ways in which desires affect our cognition and behavior. Similarly, many studies have outlined ways of handling such desires responsibly, for example, by planning in advance how to respond to them (e.g., Adriaanse, de Ridder, & de Wit, 2009), by thinking about one’s long-term goals when tempted to give in to short-term temptations (Fishbach, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2003; Papies, Potjes, Keesman, Schwinghammer, & van Koningsbruggen, 2014), or by applying mental strategies such as mindfulness (e.g., Alberts, Thewissen, & Raes, 2012; Jenkins & Tapper, in press; Papies, Barsalou, & Custers, 2012). We know less, however, about how desire arises in the first place. What are the actual psychological mechanisms that produce desires and consequently affect our behavior to fulfill them? What neural mechanisms underlie the psychological processes that lead to desire, and that are associated with behaviors such as indulging in tasty food, drinking expensive wine, or driving across the state to see a loved one? To answer these questions, we develop a grounded theory of desire and motivated behavior, and we review empirical work consistent with it. Our theory does not aim to replace earlier accounts. Instead, we further develop the cognitive, affective, and neural mechanisms that underlie desire, together with the motivated behavior that can follow, attempting to integrate and shed new light on earlier findings, especially in the domains of nonconscious goal-pursuit, habits, and self-regulation.

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