The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium

Lawrence E. Blume · William R. Zame

95 citations0/0 files storedEconometrica

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Game Theory and Applications Game Theory and Voting Systems Economic theories and models

Abstract

Two of the most important refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept for extensive form games are (trembling hand) perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium. It is shown here that, for almost all assignments of payoffs to outcomes, the sets of sequential and perfect equilibrium strategy profiles are identical. This result is obtained by exploiting the semialgebraic nature of equilibrium correspondences, following from a deep theorem of mathematical logic. Copyright 1994 by The Econometric Society.

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