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Disentangling CEO compensation: A simultaneous examination of time, industry, and firm‐level effects
16 references·0 citing·33 second hop
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References

  • 1983The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields38,372 cited
  • 1977Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony28,271 cited
  • 2004The iron cage revisited institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields25,805 cited
  • 1984Research in Organizational Behavior10,806 cited
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  • 1979Moral Hazard and Observability8,358 cited
  • 1990Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives5,080 cited
  • 1982Moral Hazard in Teams4,992 cited
  • 1999Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance4,334 cited
  • 1989Handbook of Labor Economics3,153 cited
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  • 2005Pay without performance: the unfulfilled promise of executive compensation1,936 cited
  • 2001Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are1,740 cited
  • 2013The Price of Inequality1,669 cited
  • 2007Building Theoretical and Empirical Bridges Across Levels: Multilevel Research in Management1,138 cited

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  • 2000How Much Does Performance Matter? A Meta-Analysis of CEO Pay Studies983 cited
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